Foundation of Moral Obligation

Now we come to perhaps my favorite subject in this whole discourse since it divides truth from error in a way no other truth can do.  In order to give the reader a preview of what we are about to discuss, I will state the points that we will cover here:

1. Define the foundation or ground of moral obligation, the ultimate motive.

2. Show the distinction between the foundation and the conditions needed for a moral choice to be made.

3. Compare various theories and show where there is agreement between them.

4. Show where various theories disagree.

5. Show the absurdity of various theories.

6. Point out the resultant tendency of various theories as they work out in practice.

Define the foundation or ground of moral obligation.

First, we need to say that the terms “ground” and “foundation” are synonymous.  For a moral being to consider his obligation to do a thing there must be a good or sufficient reason for the choice that he is about to make.  We should never forget that when we are speaking about moral obligation we are talking about moral action.  As we have stated, for something to be considered moral action, we know that it involves voluntary action which means that a moral being is making choices.  We should also remember that even in this area the purest definition of moral obligation relates to the ultimate intention of the moral being.  Further, when we speak of the ultimate intention, we are speaking of choosing a thing for its own sake, in other words for the intrinsic value of the object and excluding what is not intrinsic in the object.  Thus, every object of ultimate choice has a quality within itself that causes the moral being to make a choice.  Thus, the nature of this quality that causes a moral choice is that the ultimate choice has intrinsic value in its own existence and not by virtue of any relationships associated with this ultimate choice.

So now we come to the foundation of moral obligation.  The foundation of moral obligation is the reason why any moral object should be chosen for its own sake.  An example of this is that Agape Love, sacrificial love, is a universal duty because Agape Love is defined as sacrificial love; this sacrificial love values the object of the affection more than any interest or reward given to the one who loves.  Sacrificial love sees a person that is hungry and feeds them because of the value of the person and the resulting benefit to that person when he or she is fed.  Sacrificial love means that a person who loves may actually receive mistreatment from the one being loved because the one doing the loving sees value in the object of love that transcends the abuse they receive.  In short, the one doing the loving sees the ultimate end that can be attained when the one that is loved has been positively influenced by certain actions of love.  These actions, in the mind of the one doing the loving, will result in a positive result that benefits only the object and not necessarily the one who is doing the loving.  To put it another way, “I am doing this for your sake and what it will ultimately mean to your life, not because I will receive any reward or benefit from this action.”  There is a court case where the husband claims that he desires for his wife to starve to death because it is “her wishes” not to be fed by tubes.  The problem with this is that he is not making a choice based upon sacrificial love which would see the intrinsic value of a life as of more value than his will, her will, the will of the court, the judge or of any other person alive.  True sacrificial love would be when the husband sacrificed his own wishes and even what he perceives to be her wishes (which are questionable and since she cannot be questioned in her condition one must go by what is moral and what is the intrinsic value of her life) in order to allow the wife to be loved and cared for by her family.

Show the distinction between the foundation and the conditions needed for a moral choice to be made.

We said previously that the conditions of obligation are basically moral agency (conscience), free will, and light (comprehension of moral value). I must say that these conditions do not exist until a person comes to know God and when that happens they see the whole world from a different point of view.

The Bible says, James 4:17”Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.”

The Bible also says, 1 Corinthians 2:14-15 “But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.  (15) But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man.”

We can see that by definition of the Bible a person that does not have the Holy Spirit will not have one of the conditions of moral obligation fully developed, the knowledge that comes to a person by way of “light” or comprehension of the Holy Spirit. That “light” only comes when a person comes to know the Lord Jesus Christ. Every moral being does, however, have a conscience and a will to choose.  They also have enough light to understand from their conscience that they are moral beings and that they are sinners.  A sinner is held accountable for keeping the moral law because he may at any time choose to call upon the Lord, at which time he will receive the Holy Spirit which will give life to that inner light and restore it to the condition it was before Adam and Eve sinned in the Garden of Eden. He will then know the Lord.

There is no greater motive in the entire world than coming to know the Lord.  “And to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fullness of God.”  (Ephesians 3:19)  From now on through this whole book when we discuss the best end for God and the Universe, we are also making the obvious assumption that one would never desire that best end without coming to know God through Jesus Christ.  Also, when we discuss disinterested benevolence as the end as opposed to self-gratification we are also stating that no one would ever desire disinterested benevolence were it not for the love of God that was shed abroad to us through Jesus Christ.  So we are stating that knowing God and disinterested benevolence are one and the same and anything that comes short of disinterested benevolence, even the theories which we reject are merely showing that a person does not really know God or they could never make an attempt at a substitute for the true purpose in the moral law, the best end which comes from knowing God.

Compare various theories and show where there is agreement between them.

Without going into quotes or discussions of the various theories and their intricacies, these points are where there is general agreement, whether stated or implied between various philosophical and theological theories regarding moral law and its various components.  They agree in the following ways:

u In the strictest sense, moral obligation is extended to moral actions only.

u Involuntary states of mind, strictly speaking, are not considered moral actions.

u That moral actions are understood to be defined as intentions.

u That ultimate intentions are the most strict definition for moral actions.

u That the choice of an object for its own sake or for its own intrinsic value and not for any relations to the object is the true definition of ultimate intention.

u That their definition of the ground or foundation of moral obligation is the thing that causes one to make a choice of the intrinsic value of the object for its own sake.

u That while ultimate intention is what constitutes moral obligation, yet in another way the choice of the conditions and means of securing an intrinsically valuable end and the executive acts that are put forth in securing the best ultimate end are also included in the concept of moral obligation.

u That there are different forms of obligation, namely the obligation of making ultimate choices, the obligation of deciding on the conditions and means to make those choices, and the obligation to put forth executive acts that result in the ultimate choices.

u That there are various conditions of obligation.

u That a condition is a condition, not the ground of obligation.  An example of the difference is the fact that being susceptible to the concept of happiness is a condition that would enable one to will or endeavor to promote the happiness of that being.  On the other hand the value of the happiness to the individual would be the foundation or ground of the moral obligation to promote that being’s happiness.  Just because a person is susceptible of happiness is not the ground of our decision to choose the happiness of that individual.  If that were the case, susceptibility to pain and sorrow would also be a ground to choose pain and sorrow for the individual.  The difference is that the intrinsic value of happiness far outweighs the intrinsic value of pain and sorrow.

u That different forms of obligation have different conditions.

u That conditions, means, and executive acts are conditions only when there is knowledge that these are conditions and that any executive acts are possible, necessary, and useful.

u That anything can be a condition that is not a ground of obligation.

u That the well being of God and of the universe are intrinsically valuable and moral beings should choose that fact for its own sake.  They should choose to know God.

u That complete uninterrupted universal commitment to this end is the duty of all moral beings.

u That this may also be defined as disinterested benevolence or Agape Love.  It is what knowing God is all about.  God is love.

u That this commitment to the best end of God and of the universe is demanded by the law of God as Jesus said in the two commandments that include all other laws, namely loving God with heart, soul and mind, and loving ones neighbor as themselves. Another way of putting it is to come to know God because to know him is to love Him. This, they all would agree, is compliance with the spirit of the law of God and of the moral law.

u That there is no circumstance where one could fail to say that this is always right, it is duty, and without this compliance with the spirit of the moral law no real obligation can exist.

u That the reasoning of any moral agent and any revelation that a moral agent receives outside himself would conclude that the law of benevolence (agape love) is the law of right, the law of nature and that without this principle any attempt to define a moral law would fall far short of the reality of this great truth.

u That holiness, another way to define obedience to moral law (we have defined it as disinterested benevolence or agape love, knowing God) is a natural and necessary condition of the intrinsic good that is the ultimate blessedness of moral agents.  No moral agent can get what is best for him or the universe without knowing God.

u That this is a sufficient reason that this end should be chosen and it ought to be chosen for that reason.

u That the ground of the obligation of all moral agents to chose holiness and to promote it in others as a condition of the highest well-being of the whole universe, is the intrinsic nature of that good or well-being.  The relationship of holiness to this end is a condition of the obligation to choose this as a means to this end.  Knowing God is being holy.

u That truth and conforming heart and life to all known and practical truths are conditions of the highest end which is the good of being; that highest end is knowing God.  The good of being is knowing God.

u Consequently the obligation to conform to all known and practical truths is universal because the relationship to the highest good relates to these known and practical truths.

u That the intrinsic value of the good that results from moral choices is the only ground of obligation and the relation of truth is only a condition of this ground.

u That God’s wants the highest well-being of himself and of all the universe so that all his acts, his dispensations, his supreme ultimate object, and any and all things that relate to God and his actions are totally for the promotion of this end.  That highest well-being of God is for all to know him.

u That what God does should also be done by all moral agents and, in fact, this is the whole duty of not only God, but of all moral agents in the whole universe.  God loves and we should love.  God wants all to know Him and we should want all to know Him.

u That the intrinsic value of the end that is in view, i.e. the highest good of God and of the whole universe of moral agents, knowing God, is the only true ground of obligation so that moral agents must choose this end, promote this end and that for its own sake alone.  There is no greater end to be promoted than that of knowing God.

u That the intention, or can we say the consecration of moral agents to the intrinsically and infinitely valuable end of the good of God, knowing God, and of the universe is what we would define as virtue, or holiness not only in God, but also in all moral beings of the universe that know God.

u That God is perfectly, infinitely, and equally holy in everything that he does because of the fact that God is eternally promoting the highest good in His universe of moral beings.  God only wants the best for us. That is why he wants us to know Him.  He knows what we need more than we do. His purposes are never to harm or in any way limit what is best, but rather to promote the very best that can be ours as moral creatures.

u That when you look at every attribute of God, every one of them stems from the root of his love, his disinterested benevolence toward his moral creatures.  That is why knowing God is the ultimate happiness.

u That God’s creation, God’s government, the laws of the Bible and the Gospel of salvation, and even the inflicting of what are defined as penal sanctions are not in any way self motivated, but they are solely for the purpose of promoting the very best, the highest good, which includes knowing God.

u That God’s one ultimate end, His one object of choice which means his one ground of obligation which He imposes upon Himself is the ultimate good of all, the good of universal being.  That good is only found when all men know Him, the lover of their souls.

u That God requires in both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible that the Moral agents in all history choose the same end as God chooses, knowing Him which is the universal good of being and that this should be the ultimate reason for all that they do.

u These facts result in the consequent conclusion that all our obligations revolve around the obligation for us to choose the highest good to God, or to know God, and also the highest good of being which includes all known conditions and means of obtaining this ultimate end, knowing God.

u That the intrinsic value of what we are saying here is the ground of moral obligation both for God and also for all moral agents in every part of the universe.  The whole universe is better off if they know God.

u That because this end has so much value to God and also to the universe, God made it fit or right that He should require moral agents to choose it for its own sake. There is no morality outside of knowing God the choice to know God is the best choice any living being can make; it is the sum total of moral law.

u That the intrinsic value as we have defined it, knowing God, not an arbitrary sovereignty where God makes demands and wills things for his own reasons as we see in so many false cults and religions of the world, is God’s reason for requiring every living being who is a moral agent to choose this end because it has so much value.  There is nothing greater in the universe than knowing God and to choose that end is choosing the very best end for God and for the universe.  Every living being is better off knowing the author of life and happiness, joy and peace, God, the creator of all things.

u That there is so much value in choosing the highest good of both God and the universe, knowing God, that even if God did not require moral agents to choose this ultimate end, moral agents should still choose this as the ultimate end to the point that were it possible that God did not require this end or that he forbid this end, we should still choose the best end of all the universe and of God since that is the highest good of being.  It would still be best for us to know God.  There is no better choice.

We can see from all the points that have been made above and by a universal law of reason that disinterested benevolence is not only necessary but that it is a universal duty of all living moral beings.  We are saying that the end, the goal of life should be the highest good of being for all moral agents including God and that every moral agent should consecrate themselves to this end as the goal of life. The goal of knowing God is the highest good for both God and us. This has so much intrinsic value that all moral agents are obligated, whether God commands it or not, to make this their ultimate end, to consecrate their whole beings without any interruption to this very goal.

All would agree that when we talk about moral character we are talking about ultimate intentions so that a man’s character is defined by his motives in life.  When one asks how someone defines virtue, the only answer can be consecration of the life to the right end, the same end to which God is consecrated. It always amazes me that people rebel against God as if God wants some disastrous end that would make them unhappy and miserable.  On the contrary, God’s whole being and purpose is the promotion of the highest good of being of every man, woman and child in his universe. That is why knowing God is best for all. Moral beings have every reason to have the same ultimate end that God does, wanting the very best ultimate goal for the good of being.  Who would not want this end? Yes, it is a duty, but why would any moral being want anything else but the best ultimate end for all? Yet this ultimate end cannot be had without knowing God and choosing this end is choosing the best end for God and the universe.

With these facts in mind, lets look at some conflicting inconsistent theories regarding the ground of obligation.

(Please read posts relating to this page by clicking on “Foundation of Moral Obligation” at the top)